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IN TUB 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL C. FREIS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case No. 
vs, 
14184 
WHEELER MACHINERY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment on a jury verdict 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County State of Utah, the Honorahle James S. Sawaya, District 
Judge. The verdict returned and judgment thereon found 
no cause of action by plaintiff against defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter came on regularly for jury trial before 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, on May 1, 
197 5 and continued for a total of four days ending on May 
6, 1975. At the close of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of no cause of action against the defendant, and 
judgment was duly entered by the trial court accordingly. 
Subsequently, plaintiff, by and through counsel, filed a 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial. Said Motion was denied by 
the trial court after hearing on May 23, 1975, and on June 
18, 1975, plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal in this action, 
and the case is now before this Honorable Court pursuant 
to that Notice of Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Verdict 
and Judgment, or in the Alternative for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought to recover for personal injury 
sustained by plaintiff in a two-freight truck accident 
which occurred on U.S. Highway 89 at a point just north of 
the Junction 273 S.R. which is the old highway between 
Kaysville and Farmington where it crosses U.S. Highway 89. 
The accident occurred when the southbound tractor pulling 
a Peterbilt lowboy trailer loaded with a D-8 Caterpillar 
and a detached dozer blade driven by Rodney K. Bosch, 
defendant's driver, collided with the rear and left side 
of a Western Gillette truck-tractor pulling two trailers 
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under the control and operation of the plaintiff as an 
employee for Western Gillette. The plaintiff and the 
Western Gillette truck had been stalled behind traffic 
which had backed up following an accident at the above 
referred to Junction. 
At trial, substantial credible and uncontroverted 
evidence was adduced by plaintiff, including testimony and 
admissions from defendant's driver, Rodney K. Bosch, together 
with Officer John Morton and Dave Lord, an accident recon-
struction specialist and Exhibits provided by Howell 
Ujifusa, an expert photographer, all of which required a 
clear conclusion that the above described accident directly 
and proximately resulted from the negligence of defendant's 
driver, Rodney K. Bosch. Such evidence was not rebutted by 
the defendant. Further substantial credible and uncontro-
verted evidence was adduced by plaintiff showing that the 
injuries to plaintiff's cervical spine resulted from the 
said accident. Included was the testimony of Doctor Gary 
F. Larsen, plaintiff's treating physician, Doctor Thomas 
D. Noonan who independantly examined the plaintiff, Mr. 
James W. Dinger and Mr. Courtney Bluck who were co-drivers 
soon after the accident, and the plaintiff, Mr. Earl C. 
Freis. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence 
in this case, plaintiff moved the trial court for a direct 
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verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant. 
Said motion for directed verdict was denied with no 
explanation. 
Subsequent to giving of the court!s instructions, the 
jury retired for deliberation and later returned a verdict 
of no cause of action, and judgment was thereon was duly 
entered. 
Subsequent to the entry of judgment, plaintiff timely 
moved the trial court, pursuant to their provisions of rules 
50(b) and 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,. for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for 
a new trial. The trial court by order denied such motion 
after hearing on the 29th day of May, 1975. On June 18, 
1975, plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal in this action, 
and the case is now before this Honorable Court pursuant 
to that Notice of Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TUB TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
At the conclusion of evidence in the instant case, 
plaintiff moved the trial court for a directed verdict in 
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favor of plaintiff and against defendant which motion was 
denied by the court without assigning any reason for its 
refusal. Upon the return of the jury verdict of no cause 
of action, plaintiff timely moved the trial court pursuant 
to the provisions of Rules 50 (b) and 59(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or in the alternative a new trial. The trial 
court denied such motion upon hearing thereof on May 23, 
1975. The refusals of the trial court to grant plaintifffs 
motion for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and for a new trial constituted clear error, 
and the error is of such magnitude as to require a reversal 
and a remand of this case to the trial court for a new trial 
or for other appropriate action. 
It is well established as a matter of law that a Motion 
for a Directed Verdict and a Motion for Judgment N.O.V. 
properly lie and should be granted by the trial court in a 
case where there are no controverted issues of fact upon 
which reasonable men could differ and where, without weighing 
the credibility of the witnesses, there can be but one reas-
onable conclusion as to the verdict. Brady v. Southern Rail-
road, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 88 L. Ed. 329 (1943); 
Shafer v. Mountain States Tel. $ Telegraph Co., 33 5 F. 2d 444 
(9th Cir. 1964); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Larimer, 352 F. 2d 
9 (8th Cir. 1965); Patterson v. Pizitz, Inc., 353 F. 2d 267 
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(5th Cir. 1965); Jopek v. New Court Central Railroad, 353 
F. 2d 778 (3rd Cir. 1965); Herron v. Maryland Gas Co., 
3457 F. 2d 357 (5th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Powell, 351 F. 
2d 213 (10th Cir. 1965); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz, 
351 F. 2d 509 (4th Cir. 1965); 5A Moore's Federal Practice, 
Sec, 50.02(1) et seq. See also, Pence v. United States, 
316 U. S. 332, 62 S. Ct. 1080, 86 L. Ed. 1510 (1942) and 
Pollesche v. TransAmerican Ins. Co., 2 7 Utah 2d 430, 49 7 
P. 2d 236 (1972). 
In the leading case of Brady v. Southern Railroad, 
supra, the United States Supreme Court had before it the 
question of when and under what circumstances a Motion 
for a Directed Verdict is properly granted. In that 
landmark case, the Supreme Court announced the standard 
in the following terms: 
When the evidence is such that without 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there 
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the 
verdict, the court should determine the proceed-
ings by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise 
in accordance with the applicable practice without 
submission to the jury, or by judgement notwith-
standing the verdict. By such direction of the 
trial the result is saved from mischance of 
speculation over legally unfounded claims (320 
U.S. at 479-480). 
5A Moore?s Federal Practice, Sec. 50.02(1) states the 
above rule in somewhat more succinct fashion: 
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Although the language of the opinions 
concerning directed verdicts is extremely 
varied, it is now clear that a verdict will 
normally be directed where both the facts and 
the inferences to be drawn from the facts 
point so strongly in favor of one party that 
the court believes that reasonable men could 
not come to a different conclusion (At p. 
2320) . 
It is now well established, in applying the above 
rule, that an appellate court, in reviewing the action of 
the lower court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict, must 
consider the evidence in its strongest light in favor of 
the party against whom the Motion for a Directed Verdict 
was made, and give him the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify. Upon 
such a consideration, if the appellate court concludes 
that the facts adduced in evidence and the inferences to 
be drawn from the facts point to any conclusion so strongly 
that the court concludes that reasonable men could not come 
to a different conclusion, the appellant court is justified 
in overturning any ruling by the trial court on a Motion 
for a Directed Verdict which is adverse to or contra that 
required conclusion. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 82 S. Ct. 1404, 8 L. Ed. 2d 777 
(1962); Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad, 552 U. S. 512, 
77 S. Ct. 451, 1 L. Ed. 503 (1957); Girardi v. Gates 
Rubber Co., 325 P. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963); Schnee v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad, 186 F. 2d 745 (9th Cir. 1951); 
Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the above rules 
as follows: 
In the time-honored and universally accepted 
rule that a finding or a verdict must be supported 
by substantial evidence, the modifying adjective 
"substantial" has been used advisedly to indicate 
a higher degree of proof than just any evidence 
of any kind. The requirement is that the evidence 
must be sufficient in amount and credibility that, 
when considered in connection with the other evi-
dence and circumstances shown in the case, would 
justify some but no necessarily all, reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be 
the truth. And conversely, if when so considered 
it appears to be so plainly unsubstantial or incon-
sequential that the court is convinced that no 
jury acting rairly~~and reasonably could so believe 
i* > it cannot properly be regarded as substantial 
evidence. UtaH" State Road Commission v. The Steele 
Ranch, 533 P. 2d 888^1975) (emphasis added) 
The following observations are noteworthy about this 
rule: 
1. The evidence must be substantial in support of 
the verdict or a higher degree of proof than just any evi-
dence of any kind. 
2. The evidence which supported the verdict must be 
considered in connection with other evidence. 
3. If the evidence which supports the verdict is 
plainly so unsubstantial or inconsequential that the court 
is convinced that no jury acting fairly and reasonably 
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could so believe it, it cannot properly be regarded as 
substantial evidence and the court may reverse the jury 
verdict. 
Applying the above cases and authority to the case 
at bar, it is clear that the trial court erred in refusing 
to grant plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict and 
plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
In this case, the facts adduced at trial and the inferences 
appropriately drawn from those facts, point so strongly 
in favor of the plaintiff that it is inconceivable that 
reasonable men, in considering those facts, could conclude 
other than that plaintiff was entitled to a verdict in 
judgment against the defendant. 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In the instant case, the undisputed facts disclosed at 
trial reveal: 
1. That the accident which is the subject matter 
of this lawsuit occurred on U. S. Highway 89 north of the 
Junction of 273 S. R. where the old highway between Farmington 
and Kaysville crosses the said highway at the hour of approxi-
mately 10:00 a.m. in the morning on January 23, 1973. 
2. That defendant's truck-tractor pulling a Peterbilt 
lowboy tailer loaded with a D-8 Caterpillar with a detached 
dozer blade driver by defendant's driver, Rodney K. Bosch, 
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•*-.. * failed to stop behind the backed up traffic at that Junction, 
•• " mounted the island separating the four lanes of traffic in 
an effort to avoid hitting the automobiles behind plaintiff's 
vehicle, and failing in that effort about the time that it 
was passing plaintifffs vehicle was thrown against the rear-
v- end left side of the Western Gillette truck and trailers 
> being operated by the plaintiff, Mr. Earl C. Freis. (R. pp. 
'• • . 1-2, 5, 55 para. 3, 81 para. 1 under first defense, Tr. pp. 
\. 43-58, 61-67) 
• \* . At trial the defendant's driver, Rodney K. Bosch, made 
3 
• ' what amounts to an admission of liability and culpability in 
the failure to stop behind the backed up traffic when 
* analyzed in light of the statements made by the accident 
reconstruction specialist, Dave Lord. Rodney K. Bosch 
.wi admitted in his testimony that he saw the backed up traffic 
" approximately three hundred feet before reaching it, (Tr. 
'.ki p. 422, Ins. 23-30), yet he testified that he never hit 
his brakes until the last one hundred feet before reaching 
';' the said traffic. (Tr. p. 49, Ins. 20-23) Mr. Dave Lord 
... \ on the other hand testified that had the defendant's driver 
? * * 
f
 , attempted a normal stop on dry pavement on that road under 
. **. those circumstances that he could have stopped the vehicle 
* :- in one hundred and twenty-five feet (125 ft.) after having 
' taken seventy-four feet (74 ft.) indiscriminate reaction 
.*'• time at the speed of fifty miles per hour (50 mph) . (Tr.pvl64; 
Ins. 9-12, 176 Ins. 11-24) If the total footage for reaction 
time and stopping the vehicle on that slope on dry pavement 
were totalled, it would amount to one hundred and ninety-
nine feet (199 ft.) for stopping the vehicle at fifty miles 
per hour (50 mph) (125 ft, + 74 ft, * 199 ft.). If the 
defendant's driver saw the backed up traffic three hundred 
feet (300 ft.) away, he failed to act for one hundred and 
one feet (101 ft.). 
The plaintiff in Benson v. Denver and Rio-Grande Western 
Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 Pt. 2d 790 (1955) was 
held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law when 
he drove into the side of a railroad engine at a speed of 
fifteen to twenty miles an hour during a snow storm in which 
he was only able to see for twenty-five to thirty feet at 
the crossing where the accident occurred. The plaintiff 
admitted that he Knew the area and had driven it many, many 
times. The court held on page 44, 
"We believe all reasonable minds would 
agree that if plaintiff had looked he could 
have seen the approaching train in time to 
stop and avoid the collision, unless he was 
traveling too fast under the existing con-
ditions to do so" 
Then quoting from the rule set forth in Dally v. Midwestern 
Dairy Products Company, 80 Utah 133, 15 P. 2d 309, At p. 310, 
the court stated it was committed to the Dally court's rule, 
to wit, 
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,*"• .
 MIn this jurisdiction the doctrine is 
established that it is negligence as a matter 
of law for a person to drive an automobile 
upon a traveled public highway, used by 
vehicles and pedestrians, at such a rate of 
speed that said automobile cannot be stopped 
within the distance at which the operator of 
said car is able to see objects upon the high-
way in front of him." 
The Benson court concluded that since the plaintiff 
>> was driving fifteen miles per hour (15 mph) and could see 
thirty feet (30 ft.) and with a reaction time of three 
fourths (3/4) of a second he would travel sixteen feet (16 
ft.) before applying the brakes and would need thirteen feet 
(13 ft.) to stop on good dry pavement and not less than 
eighteen feet (18 ft.) on wet roads after applying the brake 
and since under those circumstances it would be impossible 
for the plaintiff to stop short of 34.5 feet he was negligent 
as a matter of law for traveling at that speed. Supra at p. 44 
Defendant's driver, Mr. Bosch, further admitted that he 
saw the patrol car about one fourth of a mile before arriving 
at the patrol car. (Tr. p. 47, Ins. 23-30, p. 48 Ins. 1-5, 
9-27), 
In dispute is a question of whether or not the officer 
was standing there doing nothing or giving hand signals. 
. According to the testimony of Rodney Bosch, he didn't know 
-* that the officer was doing anything beyond displaying his 
emergency lights. (Tr. p. 408 Ins. 4-20) According to the 
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testimony of Officer Morton who was at the scene and in the 
position and was in fact the one who was signaling there at 
the crest of the hill prior to the accident, he, Officer 
Morton, was giving hand signals in addition to displaying 
emergency lights. (Tr. p. 83 Ins. 5-17) 
Mr. Howell Uji Fusa was employed by the plaintiff to 
take pictures to show the earliest point in which traffic 
could be seen as well as the patrol car. Mr. Uji Fusa provided 
slides for the jury to see and then took corresponding 
pictures of the slides and had them blown up and placed on 
plaintiff's Exhibit Number 19. Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 
15, however, is one of those pictures which is a point three 
tenths (3/10) of a mile prior to arriving at the point desig-
nated as the tail end of the backed up traffic. At that point 
one can see from viewing that picture that a great deal is 
visible at three tenths (3/10) of a mile prior to arriving 
at the point where defendant's driver had to take evasive 
action. (Tr. p. 102 Ins. 6-15, 21-30; p. 103 Ins. 1-5. Said 
Exhibit 15 shows the truck and the patrol car and what is 
between. Also see Plaintiff's Exhibit 16) 
Officer John Morton further testified that he went back 
to the scene on April 1, 1975 and took measurements. He 
testified that according to his recollection of where the 
backed up traffic was at the time of the accident there was 
approximately three tenths (3/10) of a mile or about fifteen 
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hundred and eighty-four feet (1584 ft,) that one could see 
the backed up traffic before having to take evasive action. 
(Tr. p. 75 Ins. 2-15) From the testimonies of the above 
referred to witnesses including the defendants driver, it 
should be abundantly clear that defendant's driver, Rodney 
K. Bosch, is negligent as a matter of law. Itrs not merely 
from his own testimony but also from the corroborating and 
supplimenting testimonies of other people around. These 
evidences constitute a mass of credible and uncontroverted 
evidence that permit no other possible conclusion. 
Certainly there is no evidence that the plaintiff, Mr. 
Earl C. Freis, was in any way negligent and contributed to 
his own injury, in that it remains uncontroverted that his 
truck was stationary and that he never knew what hit him. 
On the other hand, defendants driver, Mr. Rodney K. 
Bosch, admitted that he knew he had a heavier load on and 
that it would take a longer distance to stop and that his 
speed was too fast to stop in the distance required. He 
testified that he had experience with driving heavier loads 
and knew that they were harder to handle and that he was 
carrying approximately one hundred and twenty thousand 
pounds (120,000 lbs.) of gross. (Tr. p. 50 Ins. 4-16; p. 
52 Ins. 3-6, 10-12; p. 54 Ins. 6-23; p. 55 Ins. 4-30; p. 
56 Ins. 1-30; p. 50 Ins. 24-26) As the risk increases so 
should the duty of care. As a matter of public policy, 
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when a company uses the highways to transport extra heavy 
equipment, the risk should be borne by the company rather 
than the other individuals on the highway. 
Merely because he was traveling within the speed limit 
will offer no comfort since one can commit negligence while 
driving within the speed limit. Lochead v. Jensen, 42 Utah 
99, 129 Pt. 347. UCA 41-6-46 provides: 
1. No person shall drive a vehicle on a 
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual, and potential hazards then 
existing. In every event, speed shall be so 
controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding 
with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on 
or entering the highway in complicance with legal 
requirements and the duty of all persons to use 
due care. 
3. The driver of every vehicle shall, con-
sistent with the requirements of subdivision (1) 
of this section, drive at an appropriately reduced 
speed when approaching and crossing an intersection 
or railway grade, when approaching and going around 
a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when travel-
ing upon any narrow or~winding~~road, and when special 
hazard exists with regard to pedestrians or other 
traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions, 
(emphasis added) 
(Also see the rule applied in Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P. 
2d 290 (1975) and Wcineg Brothers v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 
262 P. 2d 491, 1953 5 Am.Jur. Automobiles, Sec. 167; 60A 
CIS Motor Vehicles, Sec. 284.) 
CAUSATION AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The undisputed facts disclosed at trial further reveal 
that the said accident which is the subject matter of this 
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lawsuit caused injury to plaintiff's neck. All medical 
testimony adduced at trial from Doctors Gary F. Larsen and 
Thomas D. Noonan remains credible and incontroverted as to 
the causal relationship between the accident and the plain-
tiff's injury. Both doctors agree that plaintiff suffered 
an aggravation or injury which was superimposed upon an 
existing condition of calcium buildup or arthritis in plain-
tiff's neck. 
The only controversy between the said doctors relates 
to the extent of the damage caused by the accident. Doctor 
Noonan on the one hand believed that plaintiff would likely 
have required surgery to his neck at some point in time to 
correct the arthritic condition irregardless of whether the 
accident occurred, but in the final analysis admits that 
that condition was aggravated by the accident. Doctor Larse 
on the other hand claims that because the condition was 
asymptomatic with no neurological signs and with only a 
static condition of osteophyte calcium buildup prior to 
the accident, then shortly after the accident neurological 
signs began to appear, that the accident had to have caused 
substantial injury or damage.(Note that Dr. Noonan agrees wi 
Doctor JLarsen that the condition was a rather static type of 
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condition. Nor does Doctor Noonan dispute the fact that 
the accident itself must have caused significant and sub-
stantial damage.) (Tr. Doctor Gary F. Larsen p. 196 Ins. 
14-25; p. 197 Ins. 2-4, 16-38; p. 216 Ins. 1-11; p. 217 
Ins. 1-9; p. 233 Ins. 7-27; p. 248 Ins. 21-30; p. 249 Ins. 
1-4; p. 258 Ins. 11-21. Doctor Thomas D. Noonan p. 392 
Ins. 9-30; p. 393 Ins. 1-8; p. 375 Ins. 7-19; p. 368 Ins. 
24-28; p. 403 Ins. 17-30; p. 404 Ins. 1-19. Also see 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) 
The testimony of Doctor Larsen was very credible and 
uncontroverted by evidences adduced by the defendant. 
These were the statements made by the doctor concerning 
the real nature of plaintiff's pain. He describes as 
indicated above how plaintiff had complaints of pain begin-
ning immediately after the accident and how he discovered 
as time went on through more objective neurological tests 
that the plaintiff's pains were genuine including headaches, 
neck pain, shoulder and arm pain, and loss of grip. (Tr. 
p. 196 Ins. 14-25; p. 197 Ins. 2-4, 16-28; p. 198 Ins. 21-
30; p. 199 Ins. 1-9; p. 211 Ins 23-30; p. 212 Ins. 3-12, 
19-24; p. 212 Ins. 28-30; p. 213 Ins. 1-3, 18-28; p. 214 
Ins. 3-7, 11-13) 
In addition the doctor, just prior to performing the 
operation, performed a myelogram test wherein dye is put 
in the spine and watched through X-rays to discover 
- 17-
intrustions into the spinal canal. In this test the doctor 
discovered that there was in fact an intrusion in the spina 
canal, but due to its appearance the intrusion did not 
appear on the X-ray and it was concluded by the doctor to 
be a disk which is made of soft material which does not 
appear as opposed to the harder materials of calcium and 
bones which do appear. 
If it were a disk, the doctor stated that it would be 
more of an acute process as compared to the more chronic 
problem of osteophyte buildup. (Tr. p. 226 Ins. 5-24; p. 
230 Ins. 17-30; p. 231 Ins. 2-14, 23-35; p. 232 Ins. 17-23; 
p. 2 33 Ins. 7-27; p. 3 58 Ins. 11-21) * 
The credibility of the histories of the accident and 
the resulting pain taken by Doctor Gary F. Larsen and 
Doctor Thomas D. Noonan were reinforced by the ] testimonies c 
individuals who drove and rode with Mr. Freis before and 
after the accident. The first witness was James W. Dinger 
who had been with Mr. Freis for a period of two (2) months 
prior to the accident and who rode with Mr. Freis for one 
(1) month following the accident. It is apparent from his 
testimony that prior to the accident, Mr. Freis was a very 
productive individual who held up his end of the driving 
time as the two individuals, Mr. Dinger and Mr. Freis, rode 
together as co-drivers for Western Gillette. 
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Mr. Dinger testified, however, that shortly after the 
accident on a trip to St. Louis, Missouri, and returning 
therefrom Mr. Freis began to complain of headaches and 
requested that Mr. Dinger do the driving and from that 
time on through the next month until February 23rd, the 
relationship between the two men began to deteriorate. 
The reason given by Mr. Dinger was that Mr. Freis became 
very irritable; he began to complain of headaches and began 
to try to sluff off his driving on to Mr. Dinger. When 
the relationship deteriorated, the two men parted company 
by making a change through a trade of partners with 
another driving team. (Tr. p. 312 Ins. 7-30; p. 313, Ins. 
1-30; p. 314 Ins. 9-14; p. 311 Ins. 12, 13, 16-18) 
Thereafter with the new driving team Mr. Freis continued 
to have his problems as was testified by Mr. Courtney Bluck 
who remained with him during the next year. Mr. Bluck 
testified that Mr. Freis suffered from headaches and pains. 
He said that Mr. Freis tended to hold the team longer at 
the motels that they were staying at and began to stay at 
home so that Mr. Bluck had to obtain driving partners from 
the extra board at Western Gillette. (Tr. p. 322 Ins. 23-
28; p. 323 Ins. 16-22; p. 324 Ins. 9-26; p. 325 Ins. 12-26) 
The testimony of these two drivers remains substantially 
uncontroverted by any evidence or cross-examination by the 
defense. 
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Also submitted into evidence were the records of Mr. 
Freis days off during 1973. A chart entitled Chronology 
of Mr. FreisT Driving Position was submitted into evidence 
setting forth the months and the changes in the driving 
position starting with Mr. James W. Dinger and continuing 
on through the year of 1975. Also a part of that chart 
included the accounting of Mr. Freis1 time off on a month-
by-month basis showing a comparison of the years 1971 
through 1973. 
It is apparent from that portion of the chart having 
to do with the time off that there was a dramatic change in 
Mr, Freis' work productivity between 1972 and 1973. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 29) The information placed 
upon this chart was taken from the records kept over the 
years by Mr. Freis collectively designated as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 30. What these records and this chart show is a 
dramatic change in Mr. Freis' work productivity showing 
that something cataclysmic occurred in January of 1973. 
Testimony of Mr. James W. Dinger, Mr. Courtney Bluck, and 
the Exhibits placed into evidence during the testimony of 
Mr. Earl C. Freis (Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 30) were substantially uncontroverted by any 
evidence produced by the defendant. Also from the testimon 
of Mr. Freis, we discover that the plaintiff was very 
physically active in athletics and sports prior to the 
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accident, but became very inactive thereafter. Pictures 
showing Mr. Freis' athletic involvement were Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 31-34. Plaintiff's Exhibits 29-34 were submitted 
into evidence during the testimony of Mr. Earl C. Freis. 
(Tr. pp. 277, 281, 282, 430) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Coincident with plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V., 
plaintiff also filed a Motion for a New Trial which motion was 
also heard on the 23rd day of May, 1975. The motion for the 
new trial was also denied on May 29, 1975 by order of the 
court and without any explanation. Thereafter, plaintiff filed 
his Notice of Appeal on June 18 as set forth above.. 
During the course of the trial and cross-examination 
of Doctor Gary F. Larsen, defense counsel attempted to set forth 
a hypothet not in evidence, to wit: that at the time of the 
accident Mr. Freis indicated that he did not feel the impact 
of the defendant's truck. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the 
use of such evidence or statement not in evidence which was 
overruled pending defense counsel's ability to tie in later on. 
He was able to illicit out of Doctor Larsen that if plaintiff 
indicated no history of feeling any impact in the accident that 
likely he would not have been injured on the 23rd of January 
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1973 in the accident. (Tr. p. 235 Ins. 20-30; p. 236 Ins. 
1-26) 
Thereafter, the defense called Mr. Norval Millsap to 
the witness stand and put the question to him as to what 
was stated by the plaintiff concerning the impact of defenc 
ant's truck. (Tr. p. 331 Ins. 2-6) Before an answer was 
given, plaintiff's counsel requested to voir-dire the 
witness and thereby showed the court that the witness did 
not know whom was making the statements to him at the time 
concerning the impact of defendant's vehicle. (Tr. p. 331 
Ins. 9-30, p. 332 Ins. 1-12) 
Direct examination resumed as Mr. Berry guaranteed 
that he would be able to put it together. Counsel again 
failed to illicit from Mr. Millsap as to whom he was talkii 
to. Again Mr. Barnes objected to the admission of the 
testimony stating that there was no proper foundation 
necessary to know specifically as to whom was speaking. 
Mr. Berry then stated that at the time of the declaration 
if the plaintiff did not object to the statement being mad< 
by Mr. Dinger he automatically adopts whatever is said. M: 
Barnes disagreed saying that two people in a general locat: 
while one is speaking need not speak in order to be on a 
differing opinion. The court agreed and sustained plain-
tiff fs:objection. 
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Again Mr. Berry tried as he asked what was said by 
Mr. Dinger. The witness stated that he was not sure. 
Then again Mr. Berry asked about what was said about the 
collision by Mr. Freis and again the witness said he was 
not sure which one made any statements. Again Mr. Barnes 
objected. Again the witness stated that he couldn't 
specifically remember with whom he was carrying on the 
conversation. 
The court warned that if the witness could not recall 
who was speaking to him that the testimony could not be 
used on the area. Again Defense Counsel attempted to speak 
generically about what the two, Mr. Dinger and Mr. Freis, 
were saying by using the word Mtheyn. Mr. Barnes again 
objected to the use of the word "they11 insisting that who 
is speaking must be specified. The court agreed whereupon 
Mr. Berry asked that the jury be excused for a minute. 
While the jury was recessed, counsel proffered evidence 
of the statement, The witness stated that he could not 
honestly recall which one of them made the statement and 
testified about the conversation as follows: He, Mr. 
Millsap, had said, '" I guess you got shook up pretty bad' 
or something to that effect,'When the truck — other truck 
hit,' and one of them replied, 'We didn't--I didn't even 
feel the truck hit. All I heard was a lot of racket. I 
looked out the window and there went the mirror,'n (Note 
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that this statement was not a statement of a witness where 
a party is being identified as having stated it, but is 
merely a statement of a person at the scene of the acciden 
designated as "I") Again the witness stated that he didn1 
know who had made the statement. Mr. Barnes protested tha 
because the person can't be identified it becomes very 
prejudicial. 
The court stated that if Mr. Freis had made the state 
ment, it would be an admission of a party. If Mr. Dinger 
said it it would be hearsay stating, MThatfs the way I 
see it Mr. Berry. I don't know how else I can look at it.' 
Mr. Berry continued concerning his theory of adoption by 
not denying it and threatened that if it were not let in 
it would be grounds for a new trial. The court stated tha 
it was not afraid of those grounds. 
The court then suggested that Mr. Dinger be called 
and be asked if he had said it, whereupon iMr, Dinger was 
returned to the v/itness stand and direct examination began 
Mr. Dinger in answer to the question put said, f,I said 
nothing to Millsap about the mirror and I donft recall Mr. 
Freis saying anything/1 Mr. Berry argued that he had elim 
nated Mr. Dinger and that left Mr. Freis as the declarant. 
# • , " • • 
The court rejected that argument, but asked Mr. Barne: 
if he didn't want something of error in the record. Mr. 
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Barnes asked that it not be left for him to appeal upon. 
Mr. Berry then insisted that he could provide authority on 
the question, whereupon counsel retired with the court to 
chambers and attempted to find some authority. During the 
course of the recess, Mr. Berry failed in his effort to 
obtain the necessary authorities as is set forth in the 
affidavit of plaintiff's counsel in support of the Motion 
for a New Trial. (At R. p. 169-170) 
During the recess and after the argument in chambers, 
defense counsel still refused to accept the court's ruling. 
The court, however, in chambers promised that if Mr. Mill sap 
could be reasonably certain as to who was making the state-
ment it would be let in. Defense Counsel then approached Mr. 
Millsap in the hall and instructed him as to what he must 
say on the witness stand informing him that it would only 
be necessary for him to conclude that since Mr. Dinger had 
denied in his testimony that he was the declarant that he 
could therefore reasonably place the statement as one having 
been made by Mr. Freis. (R. p. 170 para. 8) 
Thereafter the court resumed session and the witness, 
Mr. Norval Millsap, was returned to the witness stand. As 
the questions were again asked Mr. Barnes again objected 
whereupon the court asked the witness if he was reasonably 
certain who it was that had replied to him with regard to 
the conversation. The witness stated, "Based upon Mr. 
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Dinger's statement, yes, sir." The court then overruled 
plaintiff's objection and directed counsel to go ahead. 
Whereupon, the witness answered, VI am reasonably certain 
that Mr. Freis stated that when I asked him if it didn't 
shake him up when the truck hit him and he replied, !I 
didn't feel the thing hit. I just heard a lot of racket, 
looked out the window and there went the mirror. '!f (Tr. 
pp. 331-343 ending on line 28) 
A very brief study of the record will show that Mr. 
Millsap was mistaken in that both Mr. Freis in his testim 
before the jury and Mr. Dinger in his testimony denied 
having talked to Mr. Millsap concerning any part of the 
collision or the impact of defendant's truck. The final 
testimony given by Mr. Millsap lacked a proper foundation 
because he stated, "Based upon Mr. Dinger's statement, ye 
sir." I would remind the court that Mr. Dinger's stateme 
was not made before the jury, but was made during recess 
the jury and therefore an improper foundation was made. 
That places the whole thing back where it started from. 
As the court reasoned on p. 337 Ins. 16-19 If Mr. Freis 
made the statement, it would be an admission of the party 
and therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule. If Mr. 
Dinger, however, made the statement it would be hearsay 
because it would be an out-of-court statement which is ma 
other than by a witness while testifying at a hearing 
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which is being offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. (See rule 63 of the Rules of Evidence adopted 
by the S. Ct. of Utah February 17, 1971 p. 39. See testi-
monies given by Mr. Freis and Mr. Dinger in which both 
denied having discussed the impact with Mr. Millsap p. 343 
Ins. 14-15; p. 339 Ins. 7-10; p. 302 Ins. 17-18) 
Doctor Thomas D. Noonan after giving a very similar 
history concerning plaintiff's injury to that of Doctor 
Gary F. Larsen was asked what his opinion as to the cause 
of plaintiff's condition would be if Mr. Millsap testified 
and indicated that Mr. Freis had stated at the time of the 
accident that he hadn't even felt the impact of the collision. 
The doctor testified that it would indicate to him that Mr. 
Freis had not suffered any injury at the time and that Mr. 
Freis' condition is a result of the chronic condition of 
arthritis. (jr. p. 402 Ins. 8-16) 
Obviously the use of Mr. Mi 11 sap's testimony and the 
admission of the said testimonies over plaintiff's objection 
was very prejudicial in this case in that it would tend to 
negate the histories reported by the doctors concerning the 
accident and the effect thereof. Since Mr. Millsap could 
not identify the declarant and since it was possible that 
the two individuals, Mr. Freis and Mr. Dinger, could have 
experience the impact differently, the admission of Mr. 
L. I 
Millsap's testimony was crucial to the outcome of the 
case. 
Mr. Freis was sitting behind the driver's wheel with 
his back to the door and corner that received the most 
impact as indicated on Exhibit D-23 in a relaxed position, 
(Tr. p. 188 Ins. 21-30; p. 189 Ins. 1-17), while Mr. Dinge 
was in a very rigid braced situation stretched out attempt 
to put his pants on. (Tr. p. 309 Ins. 23-30) The experic 
of the two men could have been entirely different under tl 
circumstances. 
The failure to lay the proper foundation prohibited 
the questions put to Millsap because: 
1. The situation may not have called for a reply, o 
2. There was no evidence that the plaintiff heard o 
understood such a statement, or, 
3. The plaintiff was not aware at the time that he 
had an interest in the statement being made because the 
onset of pain did not begin immediately, or, 
4. He was not in the physical or mental position tc 
deny such a statement since he felt no immediate effects 
at the time the statement was being made. 
Before defendant can use silence as an admission he 
must first prove one of the above which he did not do. 
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On the other hand, no admission can be implied 
from silence where the failure to answer was caused 
by constraint, or where the party was not aware at 
the time he had an interest, or was only indirectly 
affected, or where when the matter was presented he 
had no interest to object. 31A C.J.S. Evidence, 
Sec. 295 p. 757 
The doctrine of adoptive silence does not apply 
if the party is in such physical or mental condition 
that a reply could not be reasonably expected from 
him. Southers v. Savage, 191 C.A. 2d 100, 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 470." See also SrnijUi v. Beard 56 Wyo. 37 5, 110 
P. 2d 260. 
That these type of inquires are preliminary and necessa 
in the foundation of such questions is supported by the 
following: 
Statements made by a party may be proved by other 
witnesses when such statements are against the party's 
interest, but if it is thus sought to impeach a party, 
a proper foundation must be laid for the impeaching 
questions. Kitchel v. Gallagher, 126 Or. 3 73, 2 70 P. 
488 
The admissibility of a tacit admission 
allegedly arising from the silence of a person 
concerning a statement made in his presence 
and hearing is dependant upon whether the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement were such as to naturally cause 
for denial which is a preliminary question 
for the trial court to be determined in view 
of all the evidences in the case. 29 Am Jur 
2d, Evidence, Sect. 636 p. 689. Also see 
Klcver v. Elliott, 212 Or. 490, 320 P. 2d 263, 
70 A.L.R. 2d 1094 
Very basic, however, is the fact that before a state-
ment can be admissible against a party that party must be 
identified as the declarant. 
In any event, before a purported statement 
of a party is admissible against him, it is 
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necessary to identify the declarant as the 
party. . .Kunk. vs. Howell, 4 0 Tenn. App. 
183, 289 S.W. 874, 73 A.L.R. 2d 1304. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's 
Motion for a Directed Verdict, Motion for a Judgment N.O.V., 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial. Moreover, the 
verdict of the jury in the case was against the weight and 
preponderance of the evidence and clearly erroneous. The 
trial court further erred in admitting into evidence the 
testimony of Mr. Norval Millsap without a proper foundation 
being laid in that the said statement fortified the hypo-
thetical questions and responses being put by Mr. Berry 
throughout the trial to Doctor Gary F. Larsen and Doctor 
Thomas D. Noonan. This Court should reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand the case to the district 
court for appropriate proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J^ 
rnes 
Attorney for Appellant 
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